Estonia must be prepared for a variety of crises – both civil crises caused by (natural) disasters or pandemics and national defence crises, including military defence. Several crises in different sectors of varying severities may occur at the same time, and one crisis may cause a crisis in other sectors. We also face cross-border threats, the sources of which are difficult to identify. For this purpose, we consider all the trends affecting the security of Estonia to prepare for different crises.
The aim of the national risk analysis is to help all members of Estonian society to understand a) what the potential risks affecting our daily lives are and b) how the country as well as institutions, communities, and individuals can prepare for these crises and how to act in times of crisis.
Understanding the nature and severity of crises, as well as the responsibilities of different parties and their actions in crisis prevention and response, will encourage us to better assess personal preparedness and resilience and to be ready for any crisis.
A brief overview of threats and risks
Compared to the previous assessment, the threats and risks have remained the same, but the threat environment is changing.
We must continue to be prepared for hostile actions by Russia, and although there is no imminent military threat to Estonia, the Russian threat to Estonia is existential and long-term. The threat of a military attack from Russia depends on its hostile objectives, the war in Ukraine, the implementation of ongoing military reform, NATO deterrence, and a possible deterioration of the global security environment. If Russia achieves its objectives in the war in Ukraine, the security situation in the Baltic Sea region will further deteriorate. Therefore, we must be prepared for any hostile actions by Russia, whether in the form of escalating military aggression against Ukraine, causing illegal migration flows at the external borders of the European Union, influencing the media and information space, creating and exploiting energy dependency, or destabilising cyberspace.
The aggressiveness of Russian hybrid activities has increased and the possibility of various hybrid operations, including mass immigration, has grown – we have witnessed this in our neighbouring countries to the north and south, where Russia and Belarus have on several occasions weaponised immigration.
Of the risks that could lead to civil crises, the possibility of a maritime accident and the resulting large-scale environmental damage was considered the most likely. Freighter traffic in the Gulf of Finland has increased and the number of oil and gas tankers has increased the most. Due to EU sanctions, Russian crude oil and gas supplies are increasingly being delivered by third-country tankers, and we do not have sufficient data on their ice class, or the experience needed to sail in the Baltic Sea climate. The impact of GPS jamming must also be considered.
In addition, experts have highlighted the possibility of a major communications blackout and the possibility of a rail accident with serious consequences. The introduction and widespread spread of infectious diseases (in particular pneumococcal or airborne viral diseases) from abroad is still likely. Although a low probability at present, the low vaccination coverage of the population and the associated potential for the epidemic spread of vaccine-preventable infectious diseases is a cause for concern.
