The environment and emerging risks

Most persons with undetermined citizenship are interested in obtaining Estonian citizenship: approximately 75% of persons with undetermined citizenship would choose Estonian citizenship if they had the opportunity to choose completely freely. However, a somewhat smaller number of respondents, or 65%, have a more specific desire to apply for Estonian citizenship under the current conditions and they are of the opinion that this will happen either in the coming years (15% within the next one year and 28% within the next 2–5 years) or at some point in the distant future. 43% plan to apply within the next five years.

In the field of integration, Estonian language proficiency and its acquisition have received increased attention over the years. Proficiency in the state language affects both socio-economic and cultural integration. The goal of the transition to Estonian-language education is to offer all Estonian children, regardless of their mother tongue, the opportunity to acquire high-quality Estonian-language education. The transition of all Estonian schools and kindergartens to Estonian is in the interests of children and the youth themselves, as Estonian-language teaching helps children and young people integrate into the Estonian cultural and value space so that they do not lose their identity but expand their options. Estonian-language education supports the formation of Estonia's national identity, increases societal cohesion and reduces both educational and socio-economic segregation.

Changesin global politics, the war in Europe and its costs to society have brought with them growing concerns about security and the economy. Journalism plays a key role in shaping a unified societal understanding of what is happening in the world. Unfortunately, the media tends to amplify negative news, because conflict is a major news driver. News published in the media often finds different framings on social media, which encourages like-minded people to gather in echo chambers and thus contributes to the division of society. This is a dangerous tendency. At the same time, trust in journalism is still high, and Estonia continues to remain at the top of the list of countries in terms of press freedom.

The resilience of social cohesion in Estonia depends on people’s social ties and trust in journalism. Misinformation poses the greatest threat to those who have lost confidence in local media and whose social connections have weakened—whether due to loneliness, job loss, or other forms of deprivation. In a difficult economic situation, the challenge is how to reduce inequality in Estonian society and provide people with a sense of security and perspective for the future. In today’s complex digital and media environment, people must be better able to protect themselves from disinformation. Media and information literacy play an important role in fostering critical thinking, helping individuals navigate the daily flow of information, identify disinformation, and resist its spread. Disinformation, misinformation, and foreign influence operations and manipulations represent a serious threat to democracy and society. According to an EU survey, 86% of Europeans agree and point out that the rapid spread of disinformation is a major problem for democracy. To deceive and manipulate people, fake clones of legitimate websites as well as manipulated audio and video clips are used—designed to appeal to emotions and blur sound judgment.

The results of the children’s mental health surveys show that the older children get, the more symptoms of depression and anxiety they have, and the lower their self-assessed wellbeing. Most of the mental health problems analysed in the survey – such as symptoms of depression and anxiety, overeating, attention problems, and intentional self-harm – were more prevalent among girls. Other countries’ studies have also shown that girls rate their wellbeing lower. The study revealed that children’s mental health problems are associated with the following risk factors: more frequent family conflicts, stressed parents, bullying, school-related stress, difficulty coping with emotions, constant worrying, excessive use of smart devices, and in some cases substance use, including nicotine and alcohol. Children’s mental health is supported by good relationships with family members and friends, satisfaction with school and leisure time, participation in sports and hobbies, strong confidence, ability to cope with difficulties, good physical health, and sufficient, good-quality sleep.

Cases of deviant behaviour resulting from social tensions and deteriorating mental health will continue to be a challenge for both public health and internal security in the coming years. Efforts must focus on ensuring the economic coping of risk groups, promoting health-supporting behaviours and attitudes, and paying special attention to adolescent mental health.

Estonia’s high drug overdose mortality rate is linked to the use of potent semi-synthetic opioids, nitazenes. The growing problem of nitazene use is also confirmed by the analysis of residuals in used syringes conducted in 2024. Substances from the nitazene group remain the most common opioids found in syringes (24%). In 2024, nitazene injection spread beyond Harju County and Kohtla-Järve to Narva and Tartu. Nitazenes are extremely dangerous synthetic opioids that are easy to overdose on. In 2023, 113 drug overdose deaths were registered in Estonia, 56 of which were related to nitazenes. Preliminary data for 2024 indicate 92 overdose deaths, of which 41 were linked to nitazenes.

The number of cases of infectious diseases such as HIV infection and tuberculosis has decreased, but the incidence of HIV in Estonia is still relatively high compared with other EU countries (among the five highest in the EU).

According to the Health Board, childhood vaccination coverage under the national immunisation programme has dropped sharply after the COVID-19 pandemic. Instead of the WHO-recommended 95%, coverage in Estonia for several vaccinations is already around 70%. Experts warn that this poses a serious risk of new outbreaks. While in 2014 vaccination coverage among children in Estonia exceeded the WHO-recommended 95% for all major vaccines in the national immunisation programme, and remained above 90% until 2021, in recent years coverage has declined sharply and now averages only 73–85%, depending on the vaccine.

Estonia is estimated to have the highest level of unmet healthcare needs in Europe. In 2022, 9% of the population reported unmet healthcare needs, and in 2023 this rose to 13%, while in the EU the average is only 2–3%. This indicator improved most among high-income groups, thereby increasing inequality. Survey data show that some health services have become inaccessible to Estonians mainly due to long waiting times, but also because of high costs and long distances.

Possible trends

• The duration of snow cover will shorten, and the fire-risk season will begin earlier. Snow cover in April will become very unlikely, and in March will usually last fewer than five days. In January–February, snow cover will typically remain for fewer than 15 days. Only a few areas in northeast Estonia would still see more than half of the winter with persistent snow cover. In practice, this means persistent snow cover will almost disappear from Estonia.
• Rising air temperatures and reduced spring–summer rainfall will increase forest fire risk, although no major increase in fire frequency is forecast.
• More frequent heatwaves will pose a significant health risk for the elderly and people with chronic illnesses and will likely increase pressure on the healthcare system.
• Globally, annual rainfall will increase, along with the likelihood of extreme rainfall events. Urban flooding may occur where sewer systems cannot handle stormwater. Floods caused by snowmelt may decline but will not disappear.
• Ice cover in the Baltic Sea will continue to shrink. Currently, Pärnu Bay, Väinameri, and Narva Bay are covered with ice for about 50% of the “ice period” (15 December – 1 May). In severe winters this can reach 85%. During extreme or severe winters, which occur once or twice a decade, the entire Estonian sea area will be ice-covered for at least 30 days.
• Drift ice associated with sea ice can damage fixed offshore structures and create pack ice that hinders shipping. Pärnu Bay, Väinameri, and Narva Bay are most affected, as pack ice typically forms along the edges of fast ice.
• Rising sea levels, longer ice-free periods, and more frequent storms will increase the number of days when floods may occur due to combined factors.
• There is no evidence of increased tornado frequency in Estonia. On average, Estonia experiences two tornadoes and three to four waterspouts per year.
• Sea surface temperatures will rise, especially in May and June, with the greatest increases in the southern and central Baltic Sea. By the 2090s, sea water temperatures are projected to rise by 2.1–2.8°C in winter and spring, and by 1.0–2.0°C in summer and autumn. By 2100, lake temperatures are expected to rise by 2–7°C.
• Climate warming may increase both the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events in Estonia (e.g. heavy rainfall, droughts, heatwaves). Wind speeds are likely to increase in winter and spring by 3–18%, linked to a rise in the number of cyclones moving from the Atlantic into the region.
• In agriculture, prolonged heat and drought on the one hand, and heavy rainfall on the other, will create new challenges and affect food security. New plant diseases, pests, and weed species are also expected to spread.
• Increased rainfall, heavy downpours, and droughts will affect water quality. Hazardous substances, bacteria, and excess nutrients may leach into surface and groundwater, including drinking water.
• Long dry periods will lower water levels in shallow aquifers, which may affect the supply of water from boreholes and dug wells, as well as the replenishment of small water bodies.

In the Baltic Sea, activity by Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet” has grown significantly – tankers suspected of operating outside normal regulations to transport sanctioned Russian oil, with revenues also helping to finance the war in Ukraine. This shadow fleet has already caused incidents in the region, including damage to undersea cables by vessels with opaque ownership and operations. As long as the shadow fleet operates without restrictions in the Baltic Sea, the likelihood of further such incidents will only increase. All Baltic Sea states must actively cooperate to monitor shipping and vessel activity, respond quickly and decisively to potential incidents, collect evidence of intent in criminal cases, and hold perpetrators accountable.

A historic step for energy security was taken in 2025, when the Baltic states disconnected from the Russian and Belarusian electricity grid and successfully synchronized with the Continental European power system.

Russia and China continue to advance their strategic partnership and cooperation. China, which seeks to appear neutral regarding Russia’s war of aggression, nevertheless has a strong interest in ensuring Russia does not lose the war against Ukraine. A Russian defeat would be seen as a victory for China’s main rival, the United States, and a setback for Beijing’s ambitions to reshape the rules-based order in ways more favourable to authoritarian regimes.

In its official rhetoric, Beijing promotes the achievement of peace in Ukraine but makes no concrete proposals. China avoids openly supporting Russia but also refrains from condemning it or joining sanctions. At the same time, it supports Russia’s war machine by supplying dual-use components and other strategically important goods.

Against the backdrop of growing global instability, states are increasingly seeking to minimise economic risks stemming from global trends. Consequently, both the United States and the European Union are trying to reduce dependence on China in supply chains and technology. The spread of Chinese technology into critical infrastructure – such as energy networks, ports, and airports – poses potential security risks, including for Estonia. As Chinese technology becomes more widespread and Chinese companies expand their market share, Beijing’s leverage to influence other states grows stronger.

Situation in Estonia

Because cyberspace is global in nature, worldwide threats, trends, and opportunities are also reflected in Estonia. Both government agencies and private companies are targeted, including those providing critical services to society (such as water, energy, fuel, telecommunications, and banking). The majority of cyberattacks in Estonia are not linked to state-backed actors, but rather to cybercriminals or lone individuals who often do not fully grasp the seriousness of their actions.

For Estonia, the most common daily impact comes from ordinary cybercrime, especially investment fraud, phishing and scam calls. While phishing attacks remain the most frequent type of attack against individuals, both public- and private-sector systems are increasingly being targeted through unpatched software and related security vulnerabilities. Attackers use regular automated network scanning to identify such weaknesses. In practice, vulnerabilities are sought out daily, and once found, attempts are made to exploit them.

• In the past year, the Information System Authority (RIA) identified a record of 6,515 impactful cyber incidents in Estonia. Phishing and scam websites accounted for the largest share, increasing nearly 2.5 times in one year and rising from about half to two-thirds of all impactful incidents. The number of critical, very high-impact incidents decreased in 2024, but the total number of incidents – including attacks against government agencies and local authorities – increased.
• 2024 also set records for both the number and the scale of denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. In one wave of attacks by Russian hacktivist groups targeting Estonian public-sector websites, nearly three billion malicious requests were sent in just four hours – a volume that under normal circumstances would have taken more than 25 years to accumulate. While in 2022 every third attack was successful, last year the share of impactful DDoS attacks dropped to 18%. CERT-EE, RIA’s incident response unit, registered 580 DDoS attacks last year – 93 more than in 2023 and one and a half times more than in 2021 and 2022 combined.
• Due to geopolitical tensions, the number of DDoS attacks is expected to continue growing in 2025. Attackers are also likely to focus more on components critical to the functioning of the internet: name servers, cloud services, and authentication services, on which many other services depend.
• Following an in-depth investigation, several cyberattacks that targeted Estonian government agencies in 2020 were attributed to Unit 29155 of Russian military intelligence (GRU). Its objectives include gathering intelligence, causing reputational harm through the theft and leaking of sensitive information, and systematic sabotage through the destruction of data and computer systems. This was the first time in history that Estonia formally attributed state-backed cyberattacks to the perpetrators. In Russia’s intelligence arsenal, physical and cyber tools are increasingly intertwined, and it is likely that intelligence gathered through cyber operations may also be used in physical operations.
• The primary targets of hostile cyber-espionage in Estonia remain government agencies and the military, but also private companies, particularly providers of critical services such as energy and transport. These attacks are usually carried out by cyber-espionage units of hostile states’ armed forces and intelligence services, working continuously in the interests of their state. In addition to espionage, the likelihood of cyber sabotage – destructive cyberattacks against Estonia’s critical infrastructure – has increased. Both government institutions and companies providing essential services must acknowledge that their status makes them targets for such attacks.
• CERT-EE recorded 546 impactful fraud cases in 2023 and 624 in 2024. Fraud involving cryptocurrency is becoming increasingly common. Numerous reports were also received about phishing emails and SMS messages sent in the name of postal services or banks. This type of fraud has been popular for years and shows no signs of declining.
• Protecting personal data privacy has become ever more important as people increasingly share personal data online. Phishing attacks aimed at stealing personal data are a daily occurrence. The stolen data may be used for tracking individuals, manipulating them, or even extortion.
• Ransomware attacks have long been a major focus as one of the most damaging forms of global cybercrime. Because such attacks have also targeted essential services and critical infrastructure, preventing and mitigating ransomware is directly tied to national security. While the global number and damage of ransomware attacks increased in 2024, CERT-EE registered only about ten ransomware cases in Estonia, fewer than in previous years (though not all victims report incidents to CERT-EE). In 2024, several organizations in Estonia fell victim to ransomware because their network equipment was outdated, software was not updated, or management interfaces were not securely configured. Although Estonia has so far avoided ransomware attacks that seriously disrupt society – unlike many other countries – the possibility must be considered.
• In 2024, a record 40,287 software vulnerabilities were registered worldwide. CERT-EE issued nearly 8,000 alerts about critical vulnerabilities, more than three times the number in 2023. Global trends include the exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities in device firmware and network management systems. These vulnerabilities affected popular content management software, networking devices, e-commerce platforms, and more.
• In Estonia, 68 data breaches were recorded last year, nearly 50% more than in 2023. The largest single successful attack leaked the personal data of 700,000 individuals. As people entrust their data to more service providers, the risk of data breaches remains high.
• Cyber threats related to China, including concerns about the reliability of Chinese technology, also require increasing attention. Compared with Russia, China often acts more covertly, as its goal is not to disrupt services but to conduct cyber-espionage or pre-positioning. RIA recommends that all institutions and companies carefully assess the reliability of their supply chains, and that individuals consider the risks associated with the products and applications they use.

Estonia has chosen to be a digital society with all the opportunities and conveniences this entails. This also brings responsibility and obligation: cybersecurity must be organized by applying risk management and information security measures within organizations, and by creating a secure environment through both technical and political-strategic instruments.

After two years of economic decline, Estonia’s downturn has ended, and recovery has begun. Modest improvements in competitiveness, together with rising foreign demand, have boosted exports, returning Estonia’s economy to growth by the end of 2024. Climbing out of the downtrend caused by successive crises will nevertheless take time, as production costs in Estonia have risen more sharply than among competitors, requiring productivity gains that will only come gradually.

• In 2025, Estonia’s economic growth will reach 1.5%, accelerating toward 2.5% over the following two years.
• If the United States follows through on its plan to impose a 25% tariff on EU exports, it would significantly slow Estonia’s growth but should not trigger a recession.
• Food and service prices will continue to rise, with higher taxes adding to inflation. This year, living costs are pushed up by more expensive food and services, including the new car tax, as well as increases in VAT and excise duties. Together, tax hikes account for about one-third of price increases, with overall inflation projected by the central bank to reach 6% by year’s end.
• With income tax also rising at the beginning of 2025, household purchasing power is declining. This limits consumption and hampers economic recovery. Estonians’ disposable income in real terms will remain roughly at last year’s level. Household confidence in Estonia remains among the lowest in the EU, restraining both consumer spending and willingness to invest.
• The labour market remains stable. In previous years, the response to recession was relatively mild: employment fell only slightly, with most adjustment occurring through reduced working hours. As economic activity recovers, no immediate hiring wave is expected, since production can initially be increased using existing staff.
• Businesses sense the easing of the downturn, but the economy is still in a period of weak growth. More firms now wish to expand and are facing labour shortages than in 2024, but the number remains low compared with historical averages.
• Spare production capacity is concentrated mainly in export-oriented sectors. Over the past three years, most of the economic decline has come from manufacturing, the main exporter of goods. The activity of the transport and storage sector has also contracted significantly, affected by Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine and related sanctions.
• Despite a difficult and rapidly changing environment, business investment in fixed capital has remained roughly steady for the past three years. A more structural shift has been the recent growth of investment in the energy sector.
• The general government budget deficit in 2024 was smaller than in the previous year. By the end of the third quarter, the Estonian Statistics Office reported the deficit at €646 million, equal to 1.6% of GDP for 2024.