

The common foreign and security policy of the European Union, enlargement

11. The European Union's foreign and security policy must focus on **working towards Ukraine's victory, supporting Ukraine in every possible way, and securing its position of strength. Holding Russia accountable and giving Ukraine security guarantees to prevent future aggression form an integral part of a just and lasting peace.** Decisions regarding Ukraine and European security cannot be made without Ukraine and Europe. Estonia will never recognise changing borders by force and insists that countries retain the right to choose their own security arrangements and alliances.

12. Ukraine's **defence capability** must be supported for the long haul and to the greatest possible extent, even once the active phase of the war is over. There is a need to ensure long-term sustainable **macro-financial assistance** to Ukraine and to ensure coordinated support from the European Union and partners for Ukraine's **reconstruction**.

13. The European Union's long-term **containment policy of Russia** must ensure that Russia is unable to continue its aggression and is held accountable. This must be based on a **shared threat** assessment in the EU, according to which Russia is a long-term strategic threat to the European Union.

14. The European Union must support the establishment of a **special tribunal for crimes of aggression** against Ukraine within the framework of the Council of Europe and become its member.

15. Russia should be subject to **additional sanctions with the maximum possible impact**, as long as Russia continues its war of aggression against Ukraine. The sanctions must remain in place until Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity are restored within its internationally recognised borders and until Russia compensates for the war damages caused. Special focus is on energy carriers, the shadow fleet, and the technology enabling Russia's military recovery. We support the highest possible EU **tariffs** for goods from Russia and Belarus.

16. The principal of Russia's **frozen assets must be taken into use** for Ukraine's benefit. The frozen assets must remain frozen until Russia compensates Ukraine for damages or until the principal of the assets is taken into use.

17. **Any potential steps by the European Union that could be interpreted as a normalisation of relations with Russia must depend on Russia's prior steps to compensate for the material and moral damage caused.** The EU must avoid any economic dependence on Russia.

18. The European Union must develop and implement a **comprehensive strategy to prevent and counter Russian sabotage and hostile influence activity** both within the European Union and in its neighbourhood, especially in EU candidate countries. In this context, Estonia considers it important to implement a uniformly strict visa and residence permit policy for Russian citizens in the EU.

19. **Since the strength and credibility of the European Union's foreign policy lies in unity, its persistent malicious violation and undermining must not become tolerated.** Estonia always strongly prefers EU-wide solutions. However, on certain issues that require urgent action, it may be necessary to move forward first with a 'coalition of the willing' if one or more member states block progress in principle. If a Member State consistently and persistently threatens the values of the European Union, the EU should act and **consider withdrawing its right to vote** according to the Treaties.

20. Maintaining as **stable and functional a transatlantic relationship** as possible is crucial for the EU. It is important that the EU and the US are partners who work together towards common goals and recognise each other's strategic interests. This requires regular communication and an action plan for economic and political cooperation. An effort must be made to remove trade barriers. If necessary, the EU must stand united for its interests.

21. China supports Russia's war of aggression and is behaving increasingly forcefully and systematically on the global stage. Therefore, the EU's policy towards China **needs to be brought up to date and strengthened**, building on the EU's current three-dimensional approach to China (partner, competitor, rival), while doing more to identify and factor in the challenges China poses.

22. The European Union must take an **active and leading role in international organisations**, in cooperation with like-minded countries, to resist attempts to replace the international rules-based world order with a multi-polar order that relies on force and spheres of influence.

23. Continued efforts are required to involve **global partners**. The EU's relations and agenda for engaging global partners must centre around action against Russian aggression and support for Ukraine. The partners' action on these issues will have an impact on potential cooperation projects with the EU.

24. Estonia wants to speed up the conclusion of **new EU free trade agreements and partnerships** with countries and regions (including Mercosur, Mexico, and India) to open up new markets and investment opportunities for EU citizens and businesses; to increase the EU's economic security; and to reduce critical dependencies. To integrate Ukraine into the EU single market, it is necessary to fully implement the free trade area and replace temporary solutions with permanent ones.

25. **European Union development cooperation** must be better coordinated and promote the EU's interests. This involves using the **Global Gateway Strategy** to help global partners develop key projects through cooperation on digital, cyber, climate, infrastructure, energy, and other areas.

26. **EU enlargement** is of strategic importance. Enlargement is the EU's strongest lever to boost shared values, security, and prosperity in Europe. **We support the integration of Ukraine, Moldova, and the Western Balkans into the EU**, taking into account the measurable advances of the candidate countries. Full alignment with the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, including sanctions, is more important than ever in the new geopolitical context. Ukraine's integration with the EU needs to be accelerated in light of Ukraine's progress in the accession process and to ensure its security and economic and political stability.

27. The EU needs to **prepare and ensure its capacity to include new Member States**. The EU's

preparations for the inclusion of new Member States must run in parallel with the enlargement process.

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